Cougar Energy’s UCG plant near Coolabunia
 

Who Was In Charge?

 

March 16, 2010 … gas production underway at Cougar’s site

The Ombudsman noted that there appears to have been confusion for some time in 2009-10 as to which office of DERM was actually responsible for Cougar Energy’s Kingaroy project.

A decision was made to transfer responsibility for Queensland’s three UCG projects to a new Petroleum and Gas Unit in Brisbane.

The paper files were delivered to Brisbane in early December 2009 and the electronic files in mid-January 2010.

The regional officers considered their responsibility for managing the Kingaroy project to have ceased in December 2009.

However the P&G Unit believed the transfer of administration occurred in April 2010.

Cougar Energy was also advised that the transfer of administration would occur on April 26, 2010.

“This suggests to me that for a period of up to three months, there was a lack of clarity among DERM officers about who was responsible for the Kingaroy project file,” Mr Clarke wrote.

This occurred at the critical time when Cougar Energy was preparing for its initial “light up” which occurred on March 15, 2010, at Coolabunia.

The well failure which caused the project to be shut down occurred on March 20, 2010.

September 26, 2012

The Queensland Ombudsman has released a scathing report highlighting departmental mix-ups and critical decisions in the lead-up to Cougar Energy starting its trial underground coal gasification (UCG) project at Coolabunia.

Ombudsman Phil Clarke investigated the issuing of an environmental authority for the project, including the associated conditions, and the monitoring of the project up to June 30, 2010.

He made 16 recommendations, (see box below), in a report which he has handed to State Parliament.

The investigation focused on the actions of the relevant departments but did not cover the suitability of the actual site or the events after June 30, 2010 – which are the subject of three court actions.

“The investigation was an autopsy-style review of … the approval and oversight of the project by the relevant departments,” Mr Clarke wrote.

The departments put under the microscope were:

  • Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP),  formerly the Department of Environment and Resource Management (DERM), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
  • Department of Natural Resources and Mines (DNRM), formerly the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation (DEEDI), and the Department of Mines and Energy (DME).

Mr Clarke said he had carefully considered whether to publish the report in light of the ongoing court proceedings.

“In my view there is a significant public interest in disclosing the matters detailed in the report to allow informed public discussion and debate of the matters under consideration rather that waiting for the finalisation of litigation (which may be a significant time away),” he said.

The State Government announced on January 28 last year that the Coolabunia trial – which had been temporarily halted after a well casing failed – would not be allowed to re-start.  It has alleged traces of benzene and toluene detected in nearby groundwater were linked to the project.

No Environmental
Impact Statement

A turning point in the assessment process was a decision in December 2007 to describe Cougar Energy’s initial Mineral Development Licence (MDL) application as a “Non-Standard” application.

“Standard” applications require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to be prepared; this was not mandatory for “Non-Standard” applications.

Cougar Energy’s “Non-Standard” application was reviewed by the EPA’s regional office which recommended no EIS was required.

Mr Clarke had concerns about both the decision not to require an EIS, and also the adequacy of the EPA’s policy on the circumstances in which an EIS was required.

He also expressed concerns about apparent inconsistencies in the EIS guidelines:

I am concerned that the procedural framework does not sufficiently provide for MDL activities that have a potentially significant or highly uncertain environmental impact.

“I have concerns about the policy expressed in the EIS guideline of only requiring an EIS for an MDL where there is a high probability of a significant impact on a matter of State or national significance.

“I consider that in certain circumstances, this test is simply too high and does not adequately account for a MDL, albeit one of a small scale, that has the potential to have significant environmental impact or where its impacts are sufficiently uncertain.

“This is my view is particularly significant for situations involving novel or emerging technologies, or those previously unused in Australia,  where there is an unknown risk or high risk of environmental impact. In my view the policy is inadequate to provide environmental protection in such situations.

Mr Clarke stopped short of finding that an EIS should have been obtained in Cougar Energy’s case but he said he “had some concerns” in relation to how the assessing officer and the EPA’s Co-ordinated Assessment Committee  (CAC) had confidence ruling no EIS was required.

Mr Clarke said it was not clear sufficient consideration had been given to

  • The unexpected high level of impact on a range of environmental values
  • The uncertainty about the nature and extent of possible impacts on the environment
  • The unexpected community concern with the project.

Mr Clarke said environmental impacts could be significant, even from a small, one-off project.

“The scale of the project (or the pilot nature of it) should not be the sole determining factor for an EIS where potentially significant and/or uncertain environmental impacts are associated with a pilot activity,” he said.

However he admitted that an EIS would not have altered the ultimate outcome of the Coolabunia project;  his concerns related to the adequacy of the assessment.

Lack Of Experienced Staff

Mr Clarke also expressed concerns about lack of experienced staff in the departments under review.

The assessment committee was currently under review “due to the departure of experienced officers”.  At the time Mr Clarke did his interviews, this “assessment committee” consisted of a single officer and he was told: “all the experts we used to rely on aren’t there anymore”.

He noted that several departmental officers had commented on the “recent significant loss of expertise” from within DEHP with experienced officers either retiring or leaving for jobs in the mining, petroleum and gas industries.

“The departure of experienced staff should be a matter of concern for DEHP. For a regulatory agency whose officers need significant experience to engage in regulatory activity to achieve agency goals, the loss of expert staff has significant ramifications,” Mr Clarke wrote.

He also expressed concern that EPA officers assessing a draft Environmental Management Plan submitted by Cougar were not able to locate an expert in groundwater.

They had sought advice from the then-Department of Natural Resources and Water in Bundaberg (later to become part of DERM, and now DNRM) without determining if the people they consulted had expertise in the specific area in which the advice was sought, ie groundwater science.

“My concern is that no one with with expertise in groundwater science had input into the setting of the conditions for the environmental authority in a situation where several agency officers, including the officer responsible for conducting the assessment and preparing the conditions, believed it was necessary to obtain that input,” Mr Clarke wrote.

Recognition of Possible Community Concerns

The EPA’s assessment report noted there was a potential for “nuisance issues” (odour and noise) for the six residences within the MDL area.

“Residents may also have other concerns. For example. as many of the farms in the area use groundwater for stock watering and in some cases drinking water, they may have concerns regarding the effects of the UCG facility on groundwater,” the EPA report stated.

However despite this assessment by the EPA, there was no formal public notification process required prior to determining Cougar’s application.

And despite this lack of public notification, the EPA noted it had not been approached by any members of the public with specific concerns.

“It is not clear what weight was placed on this lack of community concern,” Mr Clarke wrote.

“However, given that there was no formal public notification required or undertaken prior to the determination of the application for an environmental authority, and therefore no method by which the community would necessarily be aware of the proposal, it would be unreasonable if a lack of any approach by members of the community with specific concerns regarding the project was considered as a positive factor in favour of the project.”

Mr Clarke said he could not reconcile the expected impacts of the project – which included water quality, water discharges, hydrology issues, groundwater, land erosion/stability, land rehabilitation and subsequent land use – with the decision not to notify people potentially affected by the project.

Ironically, if the project had required an EIS, public notifications would have been required.

The Departmental response to Mr Clarke’s report stated: “It is not practicable for all resource activities to be publically notified, and that this would impose excessive and onerous regulatory burdens, often with little benefit”.

Other Concerns

Mr Clarke also expressed concern that:

  • Cougar Energy’s expert adviser was permitted to set the “safe” level of contaminants in the groundwater without any oversight from the department.
  • An EPA assessment for a financial assurance – a bond – to be lodged by Cougar Energy suggested $1.5 million. This would cover the cost of rehabilitation of the site should the company prematurely cease operations. Cougar suggested $465,000. An internal departmental email noted the company had said the $1.5m figure would make the trial “economically unviable”. A figure of $599,306 was then agreed upon.
  • There was a need for greater oversight of compliance to environmental authority conditions; Mr Clarke expressed concern about the appropriateness of “reactive monitoring” by the department of novel or emerging technologies that involve high or unknown risks, ie waiting for something to go wrong, and relying on self-reporting of breaches of conditions.
  • There were no formal standards in place for the design and construction of UCG wells despite the fact that UCG production bores were subject to high temperature and pressures; Mr Clarke was not convinced it was reasonable for tenures for UCG projects to continue to be granted without any obligations being imposed in relation to well standards.
  • There was confusion and conflicting advice between DEEDI and DERM, and then later DNRM and DEHP, whether or not Cougar Energy required a Petroleum Facilities Licence for its Coolabunia plant.

Queensland Ombudsman’s Recommendations

Queensland Ombudsman’s Report

Mr Clarke recommended that the Director-General of DEHP undertake the following:

  • Recommendation 1 – Amend the department’s EIS trigger checklist and the EIS guideline to ensure that its policy position is clear on whether an EIS could be required in relation to an MDL that identified areas of significant impact or unknown risks.
  • Recommendation 2 – Review the department’s policy to ensure that the position in relation to MDLs is consistent with the position in relation to other applications: that is, that areas of significant impact or unknown risks for MDL applications can be taken into account in determining whether an EIS is required.
  • Recommendation 3 – Develop specific and detailed material to guide officers in responding to applications for novel or emerging technologies.
  • Recommendation 4 – Ensure there is an adequate process to achieve consistency in decision-making in relation to assessment level decisions between different regional offices.
  • Recommendation 5:
    1. Conduct a review of the department’s standard conditions for environmental authorities as soon as possible to ensure they are consistent with known best practice,
    2. Institute a process for a regular review of these conditions by experienced assessing officers and legal advisers to ensure they remain consistent with current best practice,
    3. Develop guidance for the department’s officers on how to apply the standard conditions to novel or emerging technologies, including the limits of such standard conditions.
  • Recommendation 6 – Establish a mechanism to ensure that officers have access to the necessary expertise to properly assess applications for environmental authorities.
  • Recommendation 7 – Develop a written guideline for officers who require access to expert advice when preparing environmental authorities. This guideline should include instructions for officers how to
    1. Ascertain the exact nature of the person’s expertise,
    2. Specify the advice required,
    3. Direct a request to provide that advice,
    4. Review the advice to ensure that the scope of the advice is as requested.
  • Recommendation 8 –  Should ensure that the department’s processes to assess applications for environmental authorities do not consider a lack of community concern about a proposed project as a relevant factor in determining the approval of a project or the environmental authority conditions to be applied, in situations where there has not been any formal public notification process.
  • Recommendation 9 – Provide guidance and training to officers to ensure that, in respect of the granting of environmental authorities:
    1. Conditions are appropriately drafted and tailored to the desired outcome,
    2. The standard conditions are used where they are adequate to achieve the stated purposed, recognising the potential limitations on the application of standard conditions to novel or emerging technologies,
    3. Advice is sought from experts where necessary on the appropriate conditions for projects involving novel or emerging technologies or high or unknown environmental impacts,
    4. Conditions enable the department to monitor projects as required by the level of risk of environmental impacts,
    5. Appropriate timeframes are placed on conditions to ensure that compliance can be assessed as necessary during a project.
  • Recommendation 10 – Ensure the department adopts a position of notification of potentially affected persons for all projects proposing the use of a novel or emerging technology and for projects assessed as involving medium and high level anvironmental impacts or unknown risks.
  • Recommendation 11 – Ensure copies of relevant project documents including environmental authorities, assessment reports and environmental management plans are freely available to the public.
  • Recommendation 12 – Review the guideline to ensure that adequate written guidance is provided to all officers involved in calculating or approving environmental financial assurance amounts, including:
    1. The factors which may be taken into account in setting the amount of the assurance; and
    2. The basis on which the appropriate amount of an assurance is to be calculated.
  • Recommendation 13 – Review the department’s approach to monitoring compliance with environmental authorities for novel or emerging technologies involving high or unknown risks of environmental harm to ensure that:
    1. It carries out comprehensive oversight of such projects,
    2. The penalties for failing to comply with conditions are adequate to encourage compliance,
    3. It has adequate process for proactively auditing compliance with environmental authority conditions,
    4. It is assured or has determined that environmental preconditions have been met prior to the commencement of a project.
  • Recommendation 14 – Should develop and implement a written procedure for the transfer of open files relating to environmental authorities between work units or offices which includes a requirement for written advice to all interested parties at the earliest possible time and a written summary of the current position to accompany the transferred file.
  • Recommendation 15 – Ensure that adequate obligations in relation to construction and abandoning of UCG wells are developed and implemented as the minimum standard applying to all UCG projects in Queensland regardless of the tenure type on which the projects operate.
  • Recommendation 16 – Resolve the issue of the circumstances under which a Petroleum Facilities Licence is required for UCG processes within three months of the date of this report.